Michael B. Gill



Ph.D., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1995. 

M.A., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1992.

B.A., Occidental College, 1987.


Full Professor and Head of Department, Philosophy, University of Arizona, April 2013-present.

Associate Professor, Philosophy, University of Arizona, July 2007-June 2014.

Assistant Professor, Philosophy, University of Arizona, July 2003-June 2007.

Assistant Professor, Philosophy, College of Charleston, July 1999-June 2003.

Assistant Professor, Philosophy, Purdue University, August 1995–June 1999.



Humean Moral Pluralism. Oxford University Press, 2014.

The British Moralists on Human Nature and the Birth of Secular Ethics. Cambridge University Press, 2006.



"Hume on Moral Motivation," forthcoming.

"Shaftesbury on Life as a Work of Art," forthcoming.

“Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2016.

"Love of Humanity in Shaftesbury's Moralists," British Journal for the History of Philosophy 24 (6), 2016.

"Implantable Medical Devices and End-of-Life Decisions," New Directions in the Ethics of Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, edited by Michael Cholbi and Jukka Varelius (Springer), 2015.

“Moral Pluralism in Smith and his Contemporaries,” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 3, pp. 275-306, 2014.

“Shaftesbury on Politeness, Honesty, and the Reason to be Moral,” in New Ages, New Opinions: Shaftesbury in his World and Today, edited by Patrick Muller, (Peter Lang), 2014.

“On Eating Animals,” Social Philosophy and Policy 30, pp. 201-07, January 2013.

“A Sentimentalist Account of Moral Pluralism,” Iride: Filosophia e Discussione Pubblica vol. 25, pp. 571-588, 2012.

“The Non-Consequentialist Force of Promises,” Analysis vol 72 (2), pp. 506-13, 2012.

“Humean Sentimentalism and Non-Consequentialist Moral Thinking,” Hume Studies 37 (2): pp. 165-188, 2011.

“Humean Moral Pluralism,” History of Philosophy Quarterly vol 28 (1), pp. 45-64, 2011.

“Agonizing Decisions and Moral Pluralism,” in Conduct and Character, edited by Mark Timmons (Oxford), 2011.

“From Cambridge Platonism to Scottish Enlightenment,” Journal of Scottish Philosophy vol. 8 (1), pp. 13-31, 2010.

“Ethics and Sentiment,“ in The Routledge Companion to Ethics, edited by John Skorupski (Routledge), 2010.

“Is a Commitment to Good End-of-Life Care Compatible with Physician-Assisted Suicide?” Journal of Applied Philosophy, vol 26 (1), pp. 27-45, 2009. 

“Moral Phenomenology in Hutcheson and Hume, Journal of the History of Philosophy vol 47 (4), pp. 569-94, 2009.

“Side constraints and the structure of commonsense ethics,” Lopez, T., Zamzow, J., Gill, M. & Nichols, S.  Philosophical Perspectives vol 32 (1), pp. 305-319, December 2009.

“Indeterminacy and Variability in Meta-Ethics,” Philosophical Studies vol 145 (2), pp. 215-234, 2009.

“Sentimentalist Pluralism: Moral Psychology and Philosophical Ethics,” Michael B. Gill and Shaun Nichols, Philosophical Topics, vol 18, pp. 143-167, 2008.

“Meta-Ethical Variability, Incoherence, and Error,” in Moral Psychology: The Cognitive Science of Morality (volume 2), edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (MIT Press), 2008.

“Teaching & Learning Guide for: Moral Rationalism vs. Moral Sentimentalism,” Philosophy Compass vol 3, pp. 397-400, 2008.

“Variability and Moral Phenomenology,” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences vol 7 (1), pp. 88-113, 2008.

“Moral Rationalism vs. Moral Sentimentalism: Is Morality More like Math or Beauty?” Philosophy Compass vol 2 (1), pp. 16-30, 2007.

“PICU Prometheus:  Ethical Issues in the Treatment of Very Sick Children in Pediatric Intensive Care,” Mortality, vol. 10 (4), pp. 262-275, 2005.

“A Moral Defense of Oregon’s Physician-Assisted Suicide Law,” Mortality, vol. 10 (1), pp. 53-67, 2005.

“Rationalism, Sentimentalism, and Ralph Cudworth,” Hume Studies, vol. 30 (1), pp. 149-181, April 2004.

“Presumed Consent, Informed Consent and Organ Procurement Policy,” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, vol. 29 (1), pp. 37-59, 2004.

 “Paying for Kidneys:  The Case against Prohibition,” Michael B. Gill and Robert M. Sade, Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, vol. 12 (1), pp. 17-45, 2002.

 “Shaftesbury’s Two Accounts of the Reason to be Virtuous,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 38 (4), pp. 529-548, 2000.

“Hume’s Progressive View of Human Nature, Hume Studies, vol. 26 (1), pp. 87-108, April 2000.

“Relativism and the Concept of Morality,” Journal of Value Inquiry, vol 33 (2), pp. 171-182, 1999.

“The Religious Rationalism of Benjamin Whichcote,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 27 (2), pp. 271-300, 1999.

“On the Alleged Incompatibility between Sentimentalism and Moral Confidence,” History of Philosophy Quarterly, vol. 15 (4), pp. 411-440, 1998.

“A Philosopher in his Closet:  Reflexivity and Justification in Hume’s Moral Theory,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 26 (2), pp. 231-256, 1996.

“Fantastick Associations and Addictive General Rules:  A Fundamental Difference between Hutcheson and Hume,” Hume Studies, vol. 22 (1), pp. 23-48, 1996.

“Nature and Association in the Moral Theory of Francis Hutcheson,” History of Philosophy Quarterly, vol. 12 (3), pp. 281-301, 1995.